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T HE problems related to proof of negligence on the part of the
manufacturer or assembler of products depend in large part on
the ground of negligence relied upon by the claimant. For conven-
ience, problems of proof of negligence are discussed herein with
reference to two separate and distinct general grounds of negligence.
The first is that although the product is exactly as it was intended to
be, the manufacturer was negligent either in selling such a product at
all in its intended condition or in failing to give (1) adequate warn-
ing about the dangers involved in its use or misuse or (2) adequate
instructions to avoid such dangers. The second ground of negligence
arises in situations in which the claim is that a miscarriage in the
manufacturing process brought about a condition of the product
that was not intended, and that this unintended condition caused
the product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Negligence is by definition conduct involving an unreasonable or
undue risk of harm. There must be, therefore, both a "risk of danger"
and a risk that is "undue or unreasonable." When the term "risk of
harm" is used, it is meant that an event causing harm was foreseeable
or anticipative. Therefore, there must be proof of both (1) danger in
fact and (2) foreseeable danger. In proving negligence, often it is
not necessary for plaintiff to introduce evidence of the dangers in-
volved in a given course of conduct because the dangers can be
regarded as matters of common knowledge. But this is frequently not
the case with respect to scientific knowledge related to the dangers
involved and those that should have been anticipated in the use of
products.
II. INADEQUACY OF WARNING OR INSTRUCTIONS AS A
GROUND OF NEGLIGENCE
In view of what has just been said, if the ground of negligence
alleged against a manufacturer is a failure to give adequate warning
* This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury
Litigation, held by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, on November 5-6,
1964.1 * A.B., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard; Dean and Professor of Law,
University of Texas.
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about the dangers involved or adequate instructions to avoid such
dangers, the scientific knowledge in existence at the time of sale
about the dangers involved in the use or misuse of a product and
the accessibility of this knowledge to the manufacturer are of vital
importance. It is often, therefore, of fundamental importance on
the issue of the negligence of a manufacturer or other seller to con-
sider (1) what is scientifically knowable, (2) what he actually knew
at the time of sale and (3) what he is to be charged with knowing
under our objective theories of negligence.
These questions arise most often and indeed quite frequently in
cases involving drugs, cosmetics and other chemical products simply
because most chemical products can and sometimes do bring about
unintended side effects. Regardless of how beneficial and desirable
a particular drug or cosmetic might be and even though no method
is known to make it safer for use than it already is, some people will
be allergic to an ingredient contained in it, or at least sensitive to it
on some occasions; tragic and serious harm occasionally results from
the use thereof even if utmost care has been exercised.!
In all such cases, subjecting the manufacturer to liability for harm
caused to a particular plaintiff on the basis of negligence requires the
following findings: (1) that a casual connection in fact existed be-
tween a condition or an ingredient of the product and the harm
suffered; (2) that it was a known scientific fact at the time of sale
that such harm could occur from such a condition, or if not known,
that it was a discoverable scientific fact; (3) that the manufacturer
ought in the exercise of reasonable care to have known or discovered
this fact prior to the sale of the product; and (4) that a reasonable
man either would have taken greater precautions to warn about the
dangers or would have given safer instructions regarding the method
of use. The last three findings must exist to have unreasonably dan-
gerous conduct.
Of course, evidence sufficient to justify such findings must be
introduced by the plaintiff. Therefore, he must introduce (1) evi-
dence of what the ingredients actually were and that could be harm-
ful and (2) evidence (of some character other than merely harm
following use of the product) that a particular ingredient therein
could, as a scientific fact, have caused the injury. The first problem
1 See Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; the Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1926); Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or
Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1927).
'For example, a recent California case involved the development of serious and severe
anemia following the administration of chloromycetin. Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of importance is whether or not such evidence will be sufficient to
justify a jury finding of casual connection and also an inference by
the jury of negligence. A recent illustration of this problem involved
a severe case of dermatitis resulting from the use by the plaintiff of
a spray deodorant called "Etiquet," which contained aluminum sul-
phate.! About the only evidence introduced was expert testimony by
physicians that some few people were sensitive or allergic to aluminum
sulphate. This evidence was regarded by a New York appellate court
as insufficient to serve as a basis for determining whether or not the
manufacturer's conduct was reasonable. The predication of liability
on negligence, as the court observed, requires evidence from which
a finding can reasonably be made that harm was foreseeable and that
the probable frequency and seriousness of such harmful consequences
were such as to require the taking of precautions which the manu-
facturer did not take to satisfy the requirements of reasonableness.
Whatever the rule might be with respect to warranty liability-and
this has been one of the issues in some of the cigarette cases involving
lung cancer -it is clear that there cannot be negligence in failing to
anticipate harm unless the scientific danger involved in the use of a
product was known or ought to have been known by the manu-
facturer at the time of sale.
The court in the Etiquet case concluded that the plaintiff should
have produced evidence showing the percentage of the population
that is allergic to aluminum sulphate and the defendant's oppor-
tunity to ascertain this information. There may or may not have
been scientific evidence available as to the number who are allergic
or sensitive to aluminum sulphate, but at least the court held that
without evidence of this character, negligence in failing to warn will
not be inferred merely from the fact that an infinitesimal few were
affected. Moreover, the court did not say when a manufacturer should
be charged with knowledge about the extent of the danger involved
or when the extent of such danger is scientifically known; it did say
however, that if no evidence regarding the extent of this danger is
produced, scientifically there is an insufficient basis for a finding of
negligence by the trier of fact. Thus, even though defendant may
be charged with knowledge of the current scientific literature, the
plaintiff is not relieved from the burden of showing that a danger
in fact existed which is a sufficient basis for finding negligence.
aKaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840
(1964).
4 See, e.g., Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1962).
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In a case involving the same kind of a product, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that similar evidence was
sufficient to support a finding of negligence.' In that case, the plain-
tiff had suffered injuries resulting from the use of a deodorant called
"Arrid." There was evidence that a certain number of people were
allergic to the aluminum sulphate used in the product. The trial
court concluded that there was no negligence as a matter of law
because of the statistical infrequency of injury, but the court of
appeals reversed. Although the evidence did appear to be somewhat
better than that presented in the Etiquet case, the court seemed
to hold that however statistically infrequent it is that harmful con-
sequences follow, plaintiff has introduced sufficient circumstantial
evidence as soon as he shows even a small percentage of users may
be harmed. It is then defendant's responsibility to attempt to justify
his actions to the jury.
A. Safety History
Often there may be very little known about the frequency of side
effects and allergic reactions from a certain product. But if the
product has beneficial purposes, it would normally be reasonably safe
conduct as a matter of law to dispense such product until, on the basis
of experience, a greater amount of information becomes available.
Indeed, some products have been removed from the market after a
period of marketing. What about, therefore, the admissibility of
experience history? For the most part, this question is being raised
but not answered.'
It appears that courts often have refused to hear evidence of safety
history on the ground that it constitutes a collateral inquiry, especially
if plaintiff attempts to introduce evidence of other accidents to show
the dangerous nature of the conduct in question. This is a rather
strong argument in situations in which the dangerous character of
the product can be ascertained by experimentation without refer-
ence to the frequency of occurrence. In the case of hair spray, for
example, experimentation would disclose the danger. In Hardman v.
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc.,' however, defendant was allowed to intro-
duce evidence of the safety history of its product. Plaintiff, a
fourteen-year old girl, used a hair spray called "Lanolin Discovery."
While spraying her hair, she got some of the preparation on the
'Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
6 Some years ago Clarence Morris wrote an article on the general subject of the ad-
missibility of evidence of safety history. Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence
Cases, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 205 (1948).148 Il. App. 2d 42, 198 N.W.2d 681 (1964).
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upper part of her dress. Shortly thereafter the upper part of her
dress and her hair caught on fire as, according to the evidence, she
was carrying a candle in front of her. In this case, despite plaintiff's
objection, the defendant was permitted to present in evidence in-
formation showing that despite the sale of 11,223,263 cans of Lanolin
Discovery over a period of more than six years, no complaints had
been received except that filed by the plaintiff in this case. The court
concluded that such evidence was admissible to show excusable
ignorance of the flammable nature of the product.
It would appear that as regards allergic reactions and side effects
of drugs, evidence as to frequency of harm from a particular product
ought to be admissible from both litigants if there is no scientific
literature on or the experts have no notions about the number of
persons who might be allergic to a given substance. As in other kinds
of accidents, much would seem to depend upon the availability of
other or better evidence as to (1) the danger in fact and (2) the
opportunity that defendant had to discover it. Defendant can argue
with considerable force that evidence by plaintiff of a few instances
of allergic reactions should be inadmissible unless there is some show-
ing that these cases were made known to the defendant, or unless
the examples got into the scientific literature on the subject.
B. Scientific Literature
Information about the dangers of ingredients used in chemical
products is often available in scientific literature. Recent cases make
it clear that a manufacturer is not to be judged simply on the basis
of what he knows and what manufacturers generally know. Rather
he is often expected to know at least what an investigation of the
scientific literature will disclose; i.e., he must keep reasonably abreast
of scientific information. There are three possible positions to take with
respect to this matter: First, the manufacturer should be charged
as a matter of law with the scientific knowledge; second, there should
be a presumption that he ought to have such knowledge; and third,
there should be only an inference that he should have such knowl-
edge.
It appears that generally the second alternative has been adopted,
because the manufacturer has apparently been charged with knowing
as a matter of law any scientific fact about the dangerous properties
of his product unless he comes forward with some evidence to rebut
a presumption that he should have known it. Thus, in one case no
evidence was introduced at the trial by either the plaintiff or de-
fendant except that the inhalation of berylium was dangerous and
[Vol. 19:26
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that inhalation of some berylium could be expected from the use that
would be made of glass tubing supplied by the defendant. The First
Circuit said:
Thus, once a plaintiff establishes in a Massachusetts court that a
manufacturer-defendant's product is dangerous in its ordinary use, and
that no warning of its danger was given, a presumption of the de-
fendant's knowledge of the danger arises, and this presumption with, of
course, proof of causation and injury, completes the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Hence in Massachusetts it is up to a manufacturer-defendant
to come forward, if it can, with exculpatory evidence of its faultless
ignorance of the dangers of its product to those who might use it.'
It must not be assumed from this statement that a presumption or
an inference of a product's dangerous condition will be drawn simply
from a showing that an injury was suffered simultaneously with use.
However, if expert evidence is actually introduced that a condition
of the product was dangerous, a presumption or inference may often
be indulged that the manufacturer should have been aware of it.
Presumption is used here to mean that if defendant introduces no
evidence to excuse his ignorance of the scientific literature, the jury
must find that his ignorance was inexcusable. Inference as used here
means that the jury may find ignorance is inexcusable, but is not
required to do so.
Several recent cases show to what lengths the manufacturer's in-
vestigation must extend in order to escape a finding of negligence.
In a Missouri case,' plaintiff, a housewife, contracted an extremely
rare and usually fatal malady called "allergic periarteritis nordosa."
Plaintiff's theory was that the disease was traceable to a toxic in-
gredient in defendant's hair dye, a coal-tar derivative called para-
phenylenediamine, and on this theory she obtained a judgment in the
trial court for $85,000 that was affirmed on appeal in all respects
except as to the amount. There was evidence that about ninety-five
per cent of all hair dyes contain this ingredient and that only about
three to four per cent of all users ever become sensitive to it. The
negligence alleged was the manufacturer's failure to give proper
warning of a possible systemic allergic reaction that might develop
after continued exposure. The trial court permitted plaintiff's derma-
tologist to introduce a list of twenty-three articles from Cumulative
Index Medicus. One article was in a French journal, and another was
written in Finnish. It should be noted, however, that defendant's
'Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 848-49 (lst Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956). See also Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.
1957); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
'Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
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objection was directed only to the use of any of this scientific litera-
ture as evidence, and apparently no separate and particular objection
was made to the introduction of the French or Finnish articles.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this Missouri case. The first
is that scientific literature is admissible as evidence bearing on the
extent of the manufacturer's investigation, and the second is that
a jury can conclude that a reasonable investigation would have dis-
closed the information in the scientific literature. The jury can find,
in other words, that a reasonable investigation necessarily includes an
examination of the scientific literature, and that a manufacturer may
be expected to learn more than what is ordinarily known even by
specialists. It might be argued that these requirements constitute an
unrealistic objective standard as to knowledge. But the theoretical
explanation for charging the manufacturer with even greater knowl-
edge than that known by the ordinary specialist, and greater knowl-
edge than even manufacturers of his kind have, lies in his failure to
take proper precautions to discover the dangers involved in the use
of a product before undertaking the sale thereof. The issue is an
ethical one, and an objective standard of ordinary care is applied by
the trier of fact to ethical issues.
In another recent case from Missouri, La Plant v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours &4 Co.,"° the defendant manufactured a product called
"Ammate X," a weed-and-brush killer. It was sold by a dealer to a
drainage district for use along a drainage ditch to kill some willow
trees. Plaintiff brought suit for the loss of cattle due to their eating
willow leaves sprayed with the product. The negligence alleged was
the manufacturer's representation that "Ammate X" was not hazard-
ous to livestock. The drainage district relied on the representation and
advised ranchers that there was no such danger.
When plaintiff's cattle began to die, veterinarians tried to make
a diagnosis and were unable to do so. The cause of death was thought
at first to be arsenic poisoning. Finally, a veterinarian concluded that
death could be from nitrate poisoning. He then took dead willow
leaves found in cows and had them examined by a chemist, and the
presence of nitrates was verified. The experts all agreed that the
product sold was not toxic in its original state, but that when sprayed
on vegetation the resulting chemical reaction produced nitrates as the
leaves died. Not even the veterinarians suspected the cause for some
time, but the court permitted a chemist to read from a textbook used
in agriculture classes on "Feeds and Feeding" wherein the statement
was made that " 'plants injured by 2-4-D or other weed killers may
10 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
[Vol. 19:26
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have dangerous amounts of nitrates.' ..1 The chemist also was allowed
to read from a veterinarian's manual. The court said that the manu-
facturer is to be held to the skill and knowledge of an expert; is to
be charged with superior knowledge of the nature and quality of its
products; and is obliged to keep abrest of scientific information, dis-
coveries and advances with respect thereto.
In Gielskie v. State,"a plaintiff became paralyzed following an
injection by a young physician of a tetanus antitoxin manufactured
by the State of New York. In the instructions for the use of this
antitoxin first issued in 1941, the statement was made that " 'the
intraspinous and intravenous methods are generally recognized as
far superior to the intramuscular for the initial injections.' .... Evi-
dence was introduced from doctors to show that in the years which
had elapsed between 1941 and 1954, medical opinion had changed
and that in 1954 the great weight of authority condemned the intra-
venous method which the young doctor had used. Rejecting the argu-
ment that the doctor's act was an independent intervening cause
breaking the chain of causation, the court held that the manu-
facturer-distributor was chargeable with knowledge of the medical
advances that had been made since 1941. The court also added the
statement that there was ample testimony to the effect that the
medical profession customarily relies on instructions which accom-
pany drugs and serums.
C. Proof Of Causation In Fact
With respect to proof of causation, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between negligence in the sale of a defective product and negli-
gence in failing to give adequate warning or instructions about the
dangers of a good product. Proof by plaintiff that his harm actually
flowed from an ingredient in a product that ought not to have been
marketed at all establishes, of course, casual connection between negli-
gence in the sale of a product and plaintiff's harm, but the same is
not true if the ground of negligence relied upon is inadequacy of
the warning or instructions. As the court said in Love v. Wolf, "
however negligent a drug manufacturer may be in his overpromotion
of a drug or in his failure to give adequate warning, he is not liable
if the drug is one usable only by prescription of a doctor and if the
overprescription was not caused by the overpromotion.
Evidence bearing on the likelihood of reliance on a warning if it
11 Id. at 240.
12 18 Misc. 2d 508, 191 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Ct. CI. 1959).
13 191 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
1438 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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had been given is relevant both to the issue of whether there was
negligence in failure to warn and to the issue of whether such failure,
if negligence, was a cause of the harmful consequences.'5 This dual
problem was recognized in a recent Texas case" involving an anti-
biotic reaction of calves to a serum. The alleged negligence was the
failure to warn that certain antidotes should be given in case of a
severe reaction. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not read
anything on the label and would not have been advised of any danger
even if a warning had been given, but the court said: "The court
[or jury] could have reasonably concluded that during the time this
medicine was used by Mr. Branch, if there had been a proper warn-
ing, Mr. Branch would have learned of it and acted accordingly.""'
Here, the court does not conclude as a matter of law that the
failure to warn either was or was not established to be the factual
cause, but rather permits the trier of fact on the basis of the evidence
to conclude that the warning would have been heeded. This raises the
serious question of what degree of probability must exist that the
harm resulted from the alleged negligence before the case should be
submitted to the jury. Courts have not agreed.'" Must plaintiff intro-
duce some evidence which, if believed, would justify a reasonable
person in concluding that it was more likely than not that defendant's
failure to warn was the cause, or is it enough that there is a reasonable
probability that a warning would have been heeded?
Perhaps the issue was not raised in the Missouri case involving the
hair dye,'" but the court there seemed to assume that there would be
liability if negligence were found by the jury in failing to warn and
if the jury could justifiably find that the malady was traceable to the
coal-tar derivative. Apparently the Missouri court would not require
the plaintiff to introduce evidence showing that the harm probably
would have been avoided if a warning had been given. Normally
very little, if any, evidence can be brought to bear on the issue of
what would have happened if proper notice had been given. There
are three holdings that a court could make in a particular situation:
First, causation can be presumed; second, causation can be left to the
jury; and third, the evidence is insufficient to justify a finding of
causation.
" Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840
(1964); Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Branch, 365 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error
dism.
1" Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Branch, supra note 15.
1 365 S.W.2d at 834.
s See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956).
"'Braun v. Roux Dist. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958), discussed in text accompany-
ing and following note 9 supra.
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III. NEGLIGENCE IN SALE OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
A. The Use Of Res Ipsa Loquitur
When plaintiff's theory is that his injury resulted from a defect in
the product caused by a negligent miscarriage in the manufacturing
process, the principal problem with respect to proof of negligence is
the inability or impossibility in most instances of introducing direct
evidence of an act or omission on the part of anyone in the manu-
facturing process that could be regarded as negligence. Thus, if
plaintiff reaches the jury on the issue of negligence, he must be per-
mitted to prove negligence through the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine or some other kind of circumstantial evidence.
The term res ipsa loquitur is often used to describe the only kind
and any kind of circumstantial evidence of negligence that is to be
recognized, but other courts regard it as a special kind but not the
exclusive kind of circumstantial evidence for proof of negligence.
These varying positions have been a source of some confusion and
have brought about conflicting results, particularly if the require-
ments for the application of the doctrine are those so often regarded
as necessary. For example, the assertion frequently has been made that
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is inapplicable as against a manufacturer
to accidents occurring in the course of the use of its product, because
at the time of the accident all the instrumentalities that more likely
than not were the cause of the accident were not under the defendant's
control. Thus, in a case involving the explosion of a water heater, it
was said: "In the first place we believe those cases which hold that
the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence even
though the instrumentality is not under the physical control of the
defendant at the time are limited principally to merchandise such as
food and drinks marketed in sealed containers designed for human
consumption.""0
It is submitted that few, if any, courts would follow this idea
inexorably and without qualification, especially when there is direct
evidence by an expert of a specific defect. In virtually all of the
opinions in which language of this kind is used, the plaintiff was
attempting to justify an inference of negligence against a manufac-
turer simply by showing that an accident did occur in the course of
the use of a product for some unexplained reason. The fact that plain-
tiff's injury was received at a time when the product was out of the
" Patrol Valve Co. v. Farrell, 316 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref.
n.r.e. See also Haas v. Carrier Corp., 339 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (explosion
of heating unit); Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App 1940)
error dism., judgm. cor.
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manufacturer's control is extremely important as regards an infer-
ence of negligence against the manufacturer. The nature of the acci-
dent in itself will not normally justify a finding that the accident
was the kind that would not ordinarily occur without negligence on
the part of the manufacturer. For example, evidence that a mechanic
and body finisher was injured when an abrasive disc grinder manu-
factured by the defendant broke and struck the plaintiff was re-
garded as insufficient as matter of law.'1 So also, proof by the plaintiff
that he was injured by the escape of boiling water from a vaporizer
manufactured by defendant was not, without evidence as to why the
water escaped, a sufficient foundation for a finding of negligence."2 As
was proved in the latter case, any supposition that the emission was the
result of inherent defects resulting from the manufacturing process
would be mere speculation and conjecture.
It may be fairly said, therefore, that an accident occurring in the
course of the use of a product does not justify of itself the applica-
tion of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Normally, a trial judge should
not submit the issue of a manufacturer's negligence to the jury unless
evidence has been introduced which, if believed, would justify a find-
ing of greater likelihood than not that (1) the plaintiff's injury re-
sulted from an accident attributable to a defect in the product, (2)
the defect was probably present when the manufacturer relinquished
control of the product and (3) the defect was of a kind that would
not ordinarily be present in a product at the time of sale by the
manufacturer in the absence of negligence.
B. Evidence Of A Defect In The Product
If the accident is not the kind of accident which in itself points
to probable negligence of the defendant, then the question of
vital importance upon which the courts have often disagreed con-
cerns the kind of evidence that will be required as a basis for find-
ing a defect from which an inference of negligence in causing the
defect can be made. The requirement of direct evidence of an
act or omission by a manufacturer that could be regarded as the
cause of a defect would be manifestly unfair. As Judge Brown of
the Fifth Circuit has emphasized, the oft-repeated requirement of
exclusiveness of control is only another way of saying that the cir-
cumstances must point an accusing finger at the defendant."
1. Specific Defect Identified by Expert Testimony Sufficient cir-
"Jakubowski v. Minneapolis Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
"'Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 234 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1956).
"Ozark v. Wichita Manor, Inc., 252 F.2d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Morris,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 Texas L. Rev. 257, 263 (1948).
[Vol. 19:26
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cumstantial evidence is presented when there is credible testimony
by an expert to identify a specific defect, such as when an expert has
examined the product after an accident and testifies as to why in his
opinion a specific part of the product failed to function properly.
Thus, in one case the court regarded as sufficient evidence by an ex-
pert that a brake cylinder was clogged with pieces of inner lining
of the flexible brake fluid hose from the master cylinder and that
such a condition would affect the proper functioning of the brakes.'
In Lewis v. United States Rubber Co.,5 involving a claim for in-
juries received when a tire blew out while being mounted on a wheel,
plaintiff introduced expert evidence to show that an X-ray exami-
nation after the accident disclosed a severed wire bead incorporated
in the fabric of the tire. The expert further testified that only a
great force such as would leave a mark on the tire could have caused
the breaking or the weakening of the suspect bead. Thus, this evi-
dence was fairly reliable to show that the wire bead was defective
prior to the explosion and caused the explosion, and it got the plaintiff
to the jury."6 This type of case is weak, however, if the handler or
user at the time of the accident could have done something to cause
the severance of the bead, and in this situation disagreement can be
expected. The defective brake situation is a much better case of
probable negligence because the defect was not one that misuse could
likely have caused.
2. Evidence by User of Malfunction Direct evidence, for example,
of a failure of some component part of a product to work properly
is obviously not as reliable as is expert evidence of the existence of a
defect based on an examination of a product following an acci-
dent. Nevertheless, evidence by the user of a malfunctioning of the
product has been recognized by some courts as sufficient, especially
where a product such as an automobile has been in use for only a
short time. For example, testimony of brake failure has been regarded
as sufficient for inferring a defect that likely was present when the
product was surrendered by the manufacturer. 7 In Henningsen," the
celebrated New Jersey case that extended the doctrine of strict
liability, the only evidence of a defect in an automobile that swerved
4 Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
22414 Pa. 626, 202 A.2d 20 (1964).
"See, however, Shoopak v. United States Rubber Co., 42 Misc. 2d 684, 248 N.Y.S.2d
708 (Supt. Ct. 1964) (same kind of case, but the evidence was that plaintiff could not have
mounted the tire off center and with insufficient lubrication).
" Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964); Comstock
v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
aSHenningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), noted in
39 Texas L. Rev. 694 (1961).
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off the road and crashed into a brick wall was the testimony of the
plaintiff herself. Without warning, she heard a loud noise "from the
bottom, by the hood"; it "felt as if something cracked." The steering
wheel then spun in her hands, and the automobile went out of con-
trol. It was impossible to determine after the accident whether any
of the parts of the steering-wheel mechanism had been defective. The
car had only 468 miles on the speedometer at the time. The trial
court concluded that a prima facie case of negligence had not been
established and dismissed the negligence count, but permitted the
case to go to the jury on a warranty theory. Thus, the court per-
mitted the inference of some unidentifiable defect but not an in-
ference of negligence from that unidentifiable defect. Of course, in
all these cases in which there is no expert evidence of an identifiable
defect, there always exists the very definite probability that the
whole truth about what happened at the time of the accident has
not been told.
C. Inferring A Defect In The Product As The Cause Of The Accident
By Negating Other Probable Causes
In Jakubowski v. Minneapolis Mining & Mfg. Co.," an abrasive
disc grinder broke, and as a result part of it struck the plaintiff.
Although the court denied recovery, it did recognize the possibility
of proving negligence of the manufacturer by introducing evidence
to negate probable causes of the accident (such as misuse or overuse)
other than a defect in the product at the time the manufacturer sur-
rendered possession thereof. The court said: "Accordingly, in the
absence of direct evidence that the product is defective because of a
manufacturing flaw or inadequate design, . . . it is necessary to negate
other causes. . .."
It is submitted that, outside the products liability area, negligence
of a particular defendant cannot normally be established by intro-
ducing evidence of (1) an accident of a kind that does not normally
occur without negligence of either the defendant or another and (2)
careful conduct on the part of the other. Certainly, one who is
injured in an automobile collision cannot get an inference of negli-
gence against one of the drivers by introducing evidence of the care-
ful conduct of the other, especially if he himself is one of the drivers.
In many jurisdictions, however, this is precisely what has been al-
lowed in cases involving injuries from bottle breakages or so-called
bottle explosions, because usually responsibility for the breakage of a
2042 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
'o 199 A.2d at 830. (Emphasis added.)
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bottle could rest on any of several different persons or legal entities,
such as the manufacturer, the filler and the handlers of the bottle,
including the person who was handling it at the time it broke or
exploded. If proving negligence in this manner is to be permitted in
products liability cases, some justification for it ought to be found.
Many courts have recognized that negligence may be inferred
against the filler by showing careful conduct on the part of those
handling the bottle subsequent to the filling thereof.31 Even where
this method of proving negligence is recognized, the substance con-
tained in the bottle, the nature and quantum of the evidence and its
reliability as regards careful conduct on the part of all handlers other
than defendant are quite important in determining whether or not in
a particular case plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Four
factors of importance are (1) the length of time between surrender
of possession by defendant and the breakage, (2) the number of
persons who could have had access to the bottle during that time,
(3) the nature of the substance contained in the bottle and (4) the
nature of the bottle.
In a recent Ohio case"2 involving the breakage of a bottle contain-
ing pigs' feet, the court seemed to think that ordinarily an inference
of negligence ought not to be indulged in against the packer or filler
of a bottle unless some expansive or volatile substance was enclosed.
However, it is submitted that in some of the bottle breakage and ex-
plosion cases, the facts point more likely than not to negligence of
the filler even without evidence of careful conduct on the part of
the handler at the time of the explosion. Thus, it would be quite
consistent with other products cases and with the law generally to
recognize the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine on a show-
ing by the handler at the time of breakage that he was careful."
D. Liability Of Assemblers And Component-Part Manufacturers
Some of the component parts of most products are manufactured
by persons or entities other than the final assembler or manufacturer
of the finished product. This is true of airplanes, automobiles, water-
heaters and the like. There has been much confusion as to the re-
sponsibility of an assembler who is not the actual manufacturer of
the defective part. It has often been said that an assembler is liable
"' Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d 342 (1959);
Ferrell v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 320 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
"Huggins v. John Morrell & Co., 176 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1964).
a3See Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) (milk bottle broke as plaintiff was taking it to a refrigerator just after it had
been delivered by defendant to the front door).
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for all reasonably discoverable defects and that the assembler is not
entitled to rely on the manufacturer of the component part, however
reliable that manufacturer may be. Under this view, failure to in-
spect at all is negligence, but even under this theory there remains
the further question of whether a reasonable inspection would have
revealed the defect. 4 Often the only reasonable and practical way to
operate is to rely on the component-part manufacturer, and the issue
of what constitutes a reasonable inspection when none would ordi-
narily be made presents an almost unanswerable question.
A second view is that the assembler must be negligent in failing
to inspect. Under this approach the question of whether he should
have been able to rely on the manufacturer, plus the further ques-
tion as to what the nature of the inspection should have been, is for
the jury under the usual instruction that negligence is the failure to
exercise ordinary care."
A third view is that, without regard to any personal negligence on
its part, the assembler is liable for the negligence of the manufac-
turer of the component part, even if the defect was hidden and not
discoverable. It is a type of strict vicarious liability. Certainly one
of the most important cases on this basis for liability was Ford Motor
Co. v. Mathis,"8 decided recently by the Fifth Circuit. The issue was
the liability of Ford Motor Company for an accident resulting from
a defective dimmer switch. Plaintiff was driving about fifty-five to
sixty miles per hour on a straight stretch of highway when he threw
on his dimmer switch. After the oncoming car had passed him, plain-
tiff hit the dimmer switch to return to bright lights, but the head-
lights went out altogether. The defect was clearly identified by an
expert. The jury in the trial court found that Ford was not negligent
in failing to discover the defect, because the defect was not dis-
coverable by reasonable inspection. Citing the Restatement of Torts,
section 400, which deals with the liability of a manufacturer who
places on the market a product manufactured by another as his own,
the court held that the assembler would be liable." The Fifth Circuit
said:
Though discerning industrialists or students of our economy should
know that in each car as it rolls off the assembly line there is [sic]
4 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 219 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'DeFore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 105 So. 2d 846 (1958) (defective perfume
bottle; suit against perfume manufacturer).
322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 128 (1964).
aThe 1948 revision of this section of the Restatemnent took this position, and a recent
Texas case involving a defective brake cylinder has also adopted this result. Standard Motor
Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown,
291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
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represented countless man hours of labor by workers scattered through-
out hundreds of plants independently owned and operated, not even
these sophisticated "men of distinction" would suppose that they were
bargaining for a mobile assortment of nuts, bolts and moving parts
which if well greased, coaxed and fueled would act like an auto-
mobile. . . .The purchaser does not distinguish between the manu-
facturer and the assembler.8
E. Res Ipsa Loquitur And Joinder Of Two Or More Defendants
There is a growing body of law which would permit an injured
party to show (1) that he was injured in the kind of accident that
does not ordinarily occur without negligence, (2) that in the nature
of things he could not have been responsible (or, if so, he introduces
evidence of his careful conduct), and (3) that one or the other of
two or more persons was in control of the product at some time, and
then (4) join the several defendants in the same suit and get the
case to the jury against each of the defendants on the issue of negli-
gence. A leading case on this approach is Densent v. Olin-Mathieson
Chem. Corp." The case involved a suit by a driller's helper against
several component-part manufacturers of a charge of dynamite that
prematurely exploded during seismograph operations. The compon-
ents were gelatine dynamite, a booster and an electrical blasting cap.
One defendant was exonerated because of evidence introduced in his
behalf, but the court reversed the trial court's action in excluding as
a basis for recovery the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine against
the other two defendants. The court said:
Nor is it necessary here that in order for res ipsa to apply one particular
force must be severed out, identified and held as a matter of law to be
the cause of the premature explosion .... Here from a physical stand-
point the injury was caused by a combination of the three products.
Where the consequences are so devastating and the risk to human life
so great, manufacturers of products which are components designed to
be used with other known products may not thus evade the responsi-
bility to come in and explain. That is basically what the res ipsa doc-
trine requires."
This decision is somewhat novel, although a similar result has been
reached in some of the bottle-explosion cases by joining the manu-
facturer and the filler.'
The acceptance of this principle eliminates the necessity of proving
"322 F.2d at 274.
9282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).401d. at 82-83.
"'Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) (ginger-ale bottle exploded);
Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) (Pepsi Cola exploded; bottler, dis-
tributor and retailer ioined).
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an identifiable defect as a basis for an inference of negligence by a
particular defendant, and its adoption would generally result in the
imposition of liability on a non-negligent person, although it will
never be known which one. It would appear that in this type of case
if there is no evidence on the basis of which a reasonable person could
conclude that one of the two was more likely to be negligent than
the other, the only issue for the jury would be whether or not the
accident was caused by negligence of someone. If so, the liability of
each defendant would follow.
